The LCCS laboratory (Laboratoire de Conception de Systèmes Sécurisés - Secure Component Design Lab) is at the forefront in the field of security characterization. Its strength lies in its joint research team between the CEA-LETI (Electronics and Information Technology Laboratory of the French Atomic Energy Commission) and the ENSM-SE (Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Saint-Etienne). They will present impressive demos showing weaknesses of current secure devices and ways to counter them, as well as the innovative approach of their mutualized labs.

• The need of security characterization tools to rise the level of confidence at design time
• A low-cost fault injection method based on clock reshaping for IC protoypes
• Experimental validation reports on an AES prototype

In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As we now know, real-life devices are not ideal and confidential information leaks through different physical channels. Whilst most aspects of side channel leakage are now well understood, no attacks on totally unknown algorithms are known to date. This talk will describe such an attack. By totally unknown we mean that no information on the algorithm's mathematical description (including the plaintext size), the microprocessor or the chip's power consumption model is available to the attacker.